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NOTES AND COMMENTS
parties must be given freedom of contract.19 This view does not seem
to be supported by reason, however, as it is a generally recognized
principle that freedom of contract is always controlled by considerations
of public policy20
In the instant case, the great disparity of bargaining power was
recognized, the court pointing out that the conditions were predeter-
mined in favor of the bailee. 21 Thus, the court's reasoning that a profes-
sional bailee in such a position cannot contract away his liability is
clearly supported by the weight of authority and reason.
JAmE:s M. HOLLOWELL.
Charities-Liability for Torts of Employees
Liability is generally incurred by employers for the negligent conduct
of their employees in the course of their employment.' However, at
bailee may contract to limit his liability for negligence. Van Toll v. South Eastern
R. R. Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 75, 142 Eng. Reprint 1071 (1862); Rutter v. Palmer, 2
K. B. 87 (1922). "The Federal courts permit the private bailee to limit his lia-
bility for negligence, but do not extend this privilege to public bailees, as it is con-
sidered that such an extension would be contrary to public policy." Note, 8 N. C.
L. Rav. 282, 284 (1930). But in Note, 86 U. PA. L. Rlv. 772, 774 (1938), it is
stated that ". . . the Federal courts . . . have upheld conditions exempting bailees
from responsibility for negligence and have found that they violate no rule of pub-
lic policy." Both cite McCormich v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (2d Cir. 1903). However,
the court there states, "There is no question of public policy involved. It is well
settled that the parties in such a case have the right to provide by apt language
against liability for negligence." It appears that the view expressed in The Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review is correct. See Inland Compress Co. v. Sim-
mons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (1916).
1" See Munger Auto Co. v. American Lloyds of Dallas, 267 S. W. 304 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924) (where the court held that the due process clause of the state
constitution guaranteed the right of a garage keeper to make a contract limiting
liability). See Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 135 (1948).
21 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§574, 575 (1932).
S,,... the constantly increasing number of automobiles render[s] the question
of parking a matter of public concern .... People who work in the business sec-
tions of our cities and towns and who rely on automobiles for transportation find
it difficult-sometimes impossible-to locate a place on the public streets where daily
parking is permitted. They are driven to seek accommodation in some parking
lot maintained for the service of the public. There they are met by predetermined
conditions which create a marked disparity of bargaining power and place them
in the position where they must either accede to the conditions or else forego the
desired service." Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Assoc. v. Parker, 234 N. C. 20,
24, 65 S. E. 2d 341, 343 (1951).
1 Liability is based on the respondeat superior doctrine. The reason for the
doctrine is that it is more just to make the person who has entrusted his employee
with the power of acting in his business responsible for injury occasioned to an-
other in the course of so acting, rather than leave the other, an entirely innocent
party, to bear the loss or attempt a usually inadequate recovery from the employee.
Schedivy v. McDernott, 113 Cal. App. 218, 298 Pac. 107 (1931) ; Phillips v. West-
ern Union Tel. Co., 270 Mo. 676, 195 S. W. 711 (1917) ; Bernstein v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 174 Misc. Rep. 74, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 856 (1940); Wright v. Wright,
229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948) ; Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C. 596, 18
S. E. 2d 151 (1942); West v. F. W. Woolv.orth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E. 2d
546 (1939).
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an early date, charitable institutions2 were declared to be an exception
to this general rule.3 Since most courts from the beginning sought to
qualify this exception, it is doubtful if there ever existed a doctrine of full
immunity.4 Even courts that gave lip service to the full immunity doc-
'A charitable institution is variously defined by the courts as one that is for
the relief of a certain class of persons, either by alms, education or care, and is
supported in whole or part at public expense or by charity. See City of Vicksburg
v. Vicksburg Sanatorium, 117 Miss. 709, 78 So. 702 (1918) (privately owned
corporation treating paying patients held to be charitable institution) ; Rockaway
Beach Hosp. and Disp. v. Dillon, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940) (hospital
held to be charitable institution) ; Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798
(1929) (Y.M.C.A. held to be charitable institution) ; Utica Trust and Deposit Co.
v. Thompson, 87 Misc. 31, 149 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1914) (where a gift or bequest
is left to a "charitable institution" the court will not let the gift or bequest fail
for uncertainty, it will pick an appropriate institution); PRossER, ToRTs 1079
(1941) ; Zollman, Damnage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MiCH. L. REv.
395 (1921).
'The doctrine of tort immunity for charities originated in England, by way
of dicta in the following cases: Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark and Fin. 894, 7 Eng.
Reprint 934 (1839) ; The Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark and Fin.
507, 8 Eng. Reprint 1508 (1846). These dicta were later adopted as a direct
holding in Holliday v. Saint Leonard, 11 C. B. N. S. 192 (1861). The doctrine
was then expressly repudiated in England: Mersey Docks Trustee v. Gibbs, L. R.
1 H. L. 93 (1866) ; Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1871).
Massachusetts and Maryland adopted as a rule the doctrine which had been re-
pudiated in England, giving it a new lease on life in America. McDonald v. Mass.
Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876) ; Perry v. House of Refuge,
63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1895).
"In twelve states strangers are allowed to recover against the charity: Evans
v. Memorial Hosp., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 443 (1946); Cashman v. Meriden
Hosp., 117 Conn. 587, 169 Atl. 915 (1933) ; St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind.
350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Lusk v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 199
So. 666 (La. App. 1941) ; Erwin v. St. Joseph Hosp., 324 Mich. 114, 34 N. W. 2d
480 (1948); Bruce v. Henry Ford Hosp., 245 Mich. 394, 236 N. W. 813 (1931);
Wright v. Salvation Army, 125 Neb. 216, 249 N. W. 549 (1933) ; Beanchi v. South
Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N. J. L. 328, 8 A. 2d 567 (1939); Herndon v.
Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940); Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St.
194, 39 N. E. 2d 146 (1942) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 Atl. 120
(1912); City of McAllen v. Gartman, 81 S. W. 2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Weston's Adm'x v. Hosp. of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785
(1921) ; Heckman v. Sisters of the Charity of Providence, 5 Wash. 2d 699, 106
P. 2d 593 (1940).
Eleven states apparently adhere to full immunity. See Note 5 infra. This term
is used to denote non-liability on the basis of respondeat superior. The charity
may still be liable for its omn negligence.
In six states strangers and paying beneficiaries may recover but the question
has been reserved as to non-paying beneficiaries: Carter v. Alabama Baptist Hosp.
Board, 277 Ala. 560, 151 So. 62 (1933) ; England v. Hosp. of Good Samaritan, 14
Cal. 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1939) ; Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla.
360, 199 So. 344 (1940) ; Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention,
55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) ; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints
Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938); Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial
Hosp., 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938).
Two jurisdictions impose liability if the charity is protected by insurance:
O'Conner v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n. 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835
(1939); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d
284 (1938).
Six states apparently have no decisions involving strangers, but hold that the
charity is not liable to beneficiaries: Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107
Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910) ; Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So.
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trine do not always follow it.5
The present area of conflict is the so called "stranger to the charity-
beneficiary of the charity" distinction. 6 The majority of the courts
allow strangers to the charity such as visitors, bystanders, invitees and
employees to recover against it, but refuse to allow beneficiaries of the
charity to recover. 7 A few jurisdictions draw a distinction between
paying and non-paying beneficiaries, allowing the former to recover.8
Until recently, only five jurisdictions in the United States had com-
465 (1930); Borgeas v. Ore. Short Line R. R., 73 Mont. 407, 236 Pac. 1069
(1925) ; Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 789 (1929) ; Rovers v. Ohio
Valley Gen. Hosp., 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925); Bishop Randall Hosp.
v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916).
Seven states have now imposed unqualified liability. See notes 9 and 10 infra.
In Delaware, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Vermont the question has ap-
parently never reached the courts.
The following jurisdictions have worked in these exceptions: Arkansas Valley
Co-op Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S. W. 2d 538 (1940)
(strangers) ; Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950) ; Wendt v.
Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. 2d 342 (1947); Maretick v. South
Chicago Community Hosp., 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N. E. 2d 1012 (1938) (patients);
Ratliffe v. Wesley Hosp. and Nurse Training School, 135 Kan. 306, 10 P. 2d 859
(1932) (patient); Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577
(1921) (employee) ; Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hosp., 130
Md. 265, 100 At. 301 (1817) (stranger) ; Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium
and Benevolent Ass'n, 230 Mass. 102, 119 N. E. 686 (1918) (employee); Eads v.
Y.W.C.A., 325 Mo. 577, 29 S. W. 2d 701 (1930) (employee); Hill v. President
and Trustees of Tualatin Academy and Pacific University, 61 Ore. 190, 11 Pac.
901 (1912) (invitee) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087
(1910) (paying patient); Vermillion v. Women's College of Due West, 104 S. C.
197, 88 S. E. 649 (1916) (invitee); Waldman v. Y.M.C.A., 227 Wisc. 45, 277
N. W. 632 (1938) (invitee).
' See Bodenheimre v. Confederation Memorial Ass'n, 68 F. 2d 507 (4th Cir.
1934) (plaintiff visiting the Ass'n was held to be a beneficiary) ; Boeckel v. Orange
Memorial Hosp., 108 N. J. L. 453, 158 Atl. 146 (1932) (Held visitors to be
beneficiaries) ; Bianchi v. Southe Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N. J. L. 325, 8
A. 2d 567 (1939) (member of a girl scout troop meeting in the church was held
to be beneficiary) ; President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Huges, 130 F. 2d
810 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
See Zollman, Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MIcH. L. Rv.
395, 412 (1921); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §402 (1935). For collections of cases,
see Notes, 14 A. L. R. 572 (1921); 23 A. L. R. 923 (1923); 30 A. L. R. 445
(1924) ; 33 A. L. R. 1369 (1924) ; 42 A. L. R. 971 (1926) ; 62 A. L. R. 724 (1929) ;
109 A. L. R. 1199 (1937) ; 124 A. L. R. 814 (1940) ; 133 A. L. R. 821 (1941) ; 160
A. L. R. 256 (1946).
' Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435
(1931); Hearn v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895); Winona
Technical Institute v. Stalte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N. E. 393 (1909); Bruce v. Central
Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907); Bruce v.
Henry Ford Hosp., 254 Mich. 394, 236 N. W. 813 (1913); Marble v. Nicholas
Senn. Hosp., 102 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208 (1918); Daniels v. Rahway Hosp., 10
N. J. Misc. 585, 160 Atl. 644 (1932) ; Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp.,
197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929) ; Herudon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d
914 (1940) ; Pflugfelder v. Convent of Good Shepherd, 55 Ohio App. 158, 9 N. E.
2d 4 (1936) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 Atl. 120 (1912) ; Armen-
darez v. Hotel Dieu, 145 S. W. 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Hospital of St.
Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914); Hechman v.
Sisters of the Charity of Providence, 5 Wash. 2d 699, 106 P. 2d 593 (1940).
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pletely overruled the charity immunity doctrine.9 Now two other juris-
dictions have joined this group. In both of these cases, plaintiffs, while
patients in the defendant hospitals, were injured through the alleged
negligence of employees. The courts held the charities liable for their
employees' torts on the same basis as other employers and expressly
overruled prior decisions to the contrary.'o
The North Carolina court agrees with the majority, distinguishing
between strangers to the charity and beneficiaries of the charity, and
denies recovery to the latter group. The latest North Carolina decision
is Herndon v. Massey."1
The immunity of charities from liability for torts of their employees
has been based upon four considerations: (1) the trust fund theory, (2)
the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior, (3) implied
waiver, (4) public policy.
Courts resorting to the trust fund theory say that liability would
violate the donor's intention; would misappropriate the fund to un-
authorized purposes and to persons not within the intended class of
beneficiaries; and would in effect indemnify the trustees,' 2 if the charity
is organized as a trust,13 against the consequence of their own or their
'Borwege v. City of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915 (1933); Welch
v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp., 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939) ; Dillon v. Rockaway
Beach Hosp. and Disp., 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940) (". . . it is now
settled that even a charitable hospital is liable for the acts of its servants.");
Richbeil v. Grafton Hosp., 74 N. D. 525, 23 N. W. 2d 247 (1946); Oklahoma's
reports appear to place it in the full liability group, although the only cases found
involve strangers and paying patients: Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler,
183 Old. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938) (paying patient); Gable v. Salvation Army,
186 Oki. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940) (stranger). In addition to these jurisdictions,
England, Canada and New Zealand have adopted the full liability doctrine. Hillyer
v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hosp., 2 K. B. 820 (1909) ; Powell v. Streatham
Manor Nursing Home, [1935] A. C. 243; Lindsey County Council v. Marshall
:[1937] A. C. 97, 1 K. B. 516 (1935); Lanere v. Smith Falls Public Hosp., 35
0. L. R. 98, 26 D. L. R. 346 (1915). See Goodhart, Hospitals and Trained Nurses,
54 L. Q. Rav. 553 (1938) ; Wright, Liability for Negligence of ANurses and Doctors,
14 CAN . B. REv. 699 (1936).
-J' Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 230 P. 2d 220 (Ariz. 1951); Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hosp., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950).
- "1217 N. C. 610, 85 S. E. 2d 914 (1940); See Note, 19 N. C. L. Ray. 245
(1941). Cf. Flanner v. Saint Joseph Home, 227 N. C. 342, 42 S. E. 2d 225 (1947).
1 .2 Since the adaptation of the trust to business as well as family purposes, and
those of managing property generally, recourse to the trust res has been much
more frequent in recent years. Under modern trust law, a trustee is exonerated
or reimbursed from the trust res for liability incurred in carrying out the trust
purpose. Uniform Trust Act §§13 and 14; Fulda and Pond, Tort Liability of Trust
Estates, 41 CoL. L. REv. 1332 (1941) ; Kerr, Liability of the Trust Estates for
Torts of -the Trustee's Servants, 5 TEX. L. Ra¢. 368 (1927). By express provisions,
North Carolina statutes on Trusts and Trustees are made inapplicable to trustees
of charitable trusts. N. C. GEi. STAT., §§36-36(b), 36-37(5) (1943).
. Courts do not hesitate to hold an individual liable for failure to exercise due
care even though his endeavors are charitable. See Note, 22 VA. L. REv. 58 (1935) ;
President and Dir.of Georgetown College v. Huges, 130 F. 2d 810. 815 (D. C. Cir.
1942) : "But when the charity is incorporated, somehow charity plus incorporation
creates a certainty of immunity neither can attain apart from the other." Only
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subordinate's misconduct.14 The apparent fear here is that donors
would be deterred from creating charities and from adding to their
funds by subsequent donations. Yet most of these same courts al-
low strangers to the charity to recover.' 5 There is a failure to see
that so-called dissipation and deterrence will take place whether dam-
ages are paid to strangers to the charity or to a beneficiary of the charity.
Moreover, with the increased use of accident and liability insurance by
charitable institutions, there would appear to be little or no losses
actually incurred by them even if they were held liable for their em-
ployees' torts.16 Likewise this theory would have no application where
the charity was not created or supported by donors.
Some jurisdictions hold that the doctrine of respondeat superior is
inapplicable to charitable institutions.' 7 The reasoning given to sup-
port this theory is that charities are not operated for profit and that they
stand in the relationship of a "good Samaritan" to the beneficiary. This
loses sight of the fact that application of the doctrine of respondeat
superior depends upon whether the relationship of employer and em-
ployee exists at the time of the tort.' 8 It does not depend upon the
employer's being organized for profit nor upon the relationship of the
injured person to the employer. 19 Some jurisdictions have limited this
four cases have been found where unincorporated charitable associations, not con-
stituted as trusts, have been held immune to liability for their employees' torts.
Farrigan v. Perear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 885 (1906) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217
N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940) ; Burgie v. Muench, 65 Ohio App. 176, 29 N. E.
2d 439 (1940) ; Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
I In the following cases, the courts relied primarily on the trust fund theory
in holding the charities immune. Arkansas Valley Co-op Rural Electric Co. v.
Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S. W. 2d 583 (1940) ; St. Mary's Academy of Sisters
v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925) ; Parks v. Northwestern University,
218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905); Webb v. Vought, 129 Kan. 799, 275 Pac. 170
(1929) ; Jesen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910) ;
Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885); MacDonald v.
Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876); Downes v. Harper
Hosp., 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Eads v. Y.M.C.A., 325 Mo. 577, 29
S. W. 2d 701 (1930) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 245, 75 At. 1087
(1910); Abston v. Waldon Academy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351 (1907).
: See note 7 supra.
1North Carolina has a long established doctrine that evidence of insurance is
ordinarily incompetent. Flanner v. Saint Joseph Home, 227 N. C. 342, 42 S. E. 2d
225 (1947) ; Duke v. Comm'r, 214 N. C. 570, 190 S. E. 918 (1938) ; Scott v. Bryan,
210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E. 756 (1936). See N. C. GuN. STAT. §160-191.5 (Supp.
1951) (a cause of action exists against a municipality only if it has insurance, yet
no evidence of such insurance is permissible). See note 25 infra.
17 Evans v. Lawrence Hosp., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 433 (1946) ; Lovich v.
Salvation Army, 80 Ohio App. 285, 75 N. E. 2d 459 (1947) ; Bachman v. Y.M.C.A.,
179 Wisc. 178, 191 N. W. 751 (1922).
.8 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 230 P. 2d 220 (Ariz. 1950); Wright v.
Wright, 229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948); Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C.
596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942) ; West v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E.
2d 546 (1939).
a Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, supra note 18; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§1-14
(1933).
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doctrine of immunity to beneficiaries of the charity, 20 but it would seem
that if a stranger may invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior, then
a beneficiary, whether he be paying or non-paying, may likewise in-
voke it.
In other jurisdictions, the injured party is confronted with an im-
plied waiver theory; i.e., when one enters a charitable institution, by
accepting the services rendered, he waives all right to claim damages
for injuries suffered as a result of the negligence of the charity or its
employees.2 1  This theory is based entirely on legal fiction. In some
instances this fiction is based upon physical impossibilities. In the case
of a patient who is unconscious from whatever cause when he enters, or
of a very young child, there could not be an actual implied waiver of
any right. Thus it would appear that the waiver theory amounts merely
to imposing immunity as a matter of law when other reasoning is found
insufficient to support it.
Finally, there are courts supporting non-liability upon a public policy
theory.22 Public policy, when declared, is a crystallized conception of
what the legislatures or the courts deem better for the public at large.
It is not quiescent, but actively changing with the times. In the early
days of the nonliability theories, the general good of society may have
demanded this form of encouragement of charitable institutions. But
today the standing of charitable institutions is vastly different.
2 8 If
public policy ever required that charities should be immune from liability
10 See note 7 supra.
21 In the following cases, the courts refused to allow the injured party to re-
cover, basing their decisions on an implied waiver. Power v. Mass. Homoeopathic
Hosp., 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hosp., 116 Cal. App.
375, 2 P. 2d 530 (1931) ; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho
350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E.
537 (1924); Bruche v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich, 230, 119
N. W. 951 (1907) ; Bruche v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 789 (1929) ; Hos-
pital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914).
22 Emery v. Jewish Hosp. 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1821) ; Ducan v. Ne-
braska Sanitarium and Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912);
D'Anato v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 Atl. 340 (1925); Lindler
v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (1914) ; Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital
of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921). See Ray v. Tucson
Medical Center, 230 P. 2d 220, 223 (Ariz. 1951).
2 Many hospitals of today have grown into enormous businesses employing
many persons. They own and hold large assets, tax free by statute. Moreover,
the state has become paternal as evidenced by numerous statutes such as those for
the relief of soldiers, sailors and marines; support for the poor; county homes;
indigent tuberculosis patients; medical and surgical treatment of indigent persons.
Many courts are taking judicial notice of the extensive use of the many types
of hospital insurance, as well as liability insurance by charitable institutions. Notes,
20 B. U. L. Rzv. 330 (1940); 53 HARv. L. Ray. 873 (1940); 24 MINN. L. Ray.
696 (1940); 12 Rocy MT. L. Rav. 135 (1940); 14 TENN. L. Ray. 468 (1937).
In Louisiana, the plaintiff may sue the insurance company directly and the defense
of charity is not available. Lusk v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 199
So. 666 (La. App. 1941).
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for the torts of their employees that policy would appear no longer to
exist.
2 4
It is believed that charities today should respond as do private indi-
viduals, business corporations and others, when their employees commit
a tort.-Y' This could be accomplished by legislation or by court decisions
as in the Arizona-and Iowa cases.
ROLAND C. BRASWELU.
Constitutional Law-Effect of Press Publicity
on Criminal Defendant
In Shepard v. Florida,1 the concurring justices2 point to aspects
of the case ignored by a per curiam decision which reversed a rape
conviction because of discrimination against Negroes in jury selection.3
The concurring opinion pointed to the "lynch" atmosphere that con-
trolled the area following the alleged offense, attributing it to racial
prejudice.4 A mob attempted to take the prisoners from jail; the home
of the parents of one defendant was burned as were two other Negro
homes. All Negroes abandoned the area until military units restored
order. Prejudicial articles, daily accounts of the mob actions, and a
cartoon showing four electric chairs demanding "No Compromise-
Supreme Penalty" appeared in the local newspapers. No confession was
introduced in evidence yet the press printed reports that the defendants
had confessed, and the sheriff was credited as being the source of the
information. These published reports were never repudiated or re-
tracted. Although motions to delay the trial and for change of venue
were denied, extraordinary and observable precautions were adopted by
the trial judge to prevent violence in the court-room.
Justice Jackson calls the jury discrimination a trivial matter when
compared with these elements:
"' "The fact that the courts may have at an early date, in response to what
appeared good as a matter of policy, created an immunity, does not appear to us a
sound reason for continuing the same, when under all legal theories, it is basically
unsound and especially so, when the reasons upon which it was built, no longer
exist." Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp., 241 Iowa 1269, 1274, 45 N. W. 2d 151,
154 (1950).
" See ScoTT, TRUSTS §402 (1939); HARPER, TORTS §294 (1933); PROSSER,
ToRTs 1079 (1941); Applaman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions. 22
A. B. A. J. 48 (1936) ; Feezer, The Tort of Charities, 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 191
(1928); See Notes, 14 B. U. L. Rrv. 477 (1924); 22 VA. L. REv. 58 (1935); 48
Yale L. J. 81 (1938).
171 Sup. Ct. 549 (1951).2 Justice Jackson with whom justice Frankfurter joined, 71 Sup. Ct. 549 (1951).
Citing Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950).
'But see Shepard v. State, 46 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1950) "The inflamed public
sentiment was against the crime with which the appellants were charged rather
than the defendants' race."
1951]
